Rather than invoke the Supremacy Clause and assert that the CSA preempts conflicting state law, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has attempted to provide guidance in a series of memoranda. While affirming the DOJ's authority to enforce the CSA, the memoranda suggest that direct enforcement is not a high priority for the federal government in states that have legalized or decriminalized marijuana and have their own effective regulatory systems. 2 Nevertheless, the tenor of these oft-quoted documents is advisory and interpretive, underscoring the ephemeral nature of any wisdom divined from them. The reaction of the federal executive branch thus is impermanent and uncertain on several levels. A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. 3 Because the CSA criminalizes conduct permitted under Amendment 64, a straightforward reading of Colo. RPC 1.2(d) suggested that a lawyer counseling or assisting a client with respect to conduct consistent with Amendment 64 was in violation of the Rule. 4 On the other hand, reading Colo. RPC 1.2(d) to deny clients the assistance of lawyers in navigating a complex and evolving area of law seemed unreasonable to some. 5 Having not opted out of Colo. RPC 8.5, the USDC is bound by its provisions. 11 Colo. RPC 8.5(a) deals with disciplinary authority and states in relevant part:
A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. . . . A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct. 12 The rule provides that an attorney's conduct is subject to discipline in "this jurisdiction" regardless of where the conduct occurs. The plain language of the rule establishes that because Attorneys A and B are admitted to practice before the USDC, they are both subject to the disciplinary authority of the court. The pertinent question becomes: Which rules of professional conduct would the USDC apply if it were to discipline Attorneys A and B? Is it the Colo. RPC, which permit, per Comment 14, attorneys' assistance to Amendment 64 clients, or its Local Attorney Rules, which reject Comment 14 and therefore prohibit it? Clearly, only one set of rules of professional conduct may apply to any particular attorney conduct. 13 Colo. RPC 8. On the other hand, the USDC might decide to exercise its inherent power to apply its Local Attorney Rules, Colo. RPC 8.5 notwithstanding, finding that any other construction would deny its ability to discipline lawyers admitted to its bar and force it to apply Colo. RPC 1.2 Comment 14, which it explicitly rejected. The USDC has the power to discipline or disbar attorneys admitted to practice before it. 18 Nothing in the Local Rules negates or diminishes the USDC's inherent power to discipline attorneys who are members of its bar. 19 This disciplinary and contempt power is "far-reaching and potentially drastic." 20 Thus, while contemplating what rules the USDC will apply, it is incumbent on attorneys practicing before it to recognize that the court may invoke its inherent power to apply its Local Rule 2(b), ostensibly even to attorney conduct in matters not pending before it. 21 Here, if the USDC were to invoke its inherent power to disregard its own Rule 8.5(b)(2), Attorney B's representation of Client X would be subject to Local Rule 2(b) although the representation of Client X was not before the tribunal and was unrelated to its representation of Client Y before the court.
In sum, Colorado lawyers admitted to practice before the USDC assume a nontrivial risk by representing Amendment 64 clients. In matters pending permitted an attorney to assist a client regarding Amendment 64, but accepted that an attorney could advise his or her client regarding Amendment 64 and related federal law and policy. 22 Further, the USDC has adopted Colo. RPC 1.2(d), which states that while a "lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal," a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. 23 This requires an analysis of the difference between three categories of attorney conduct: (1) discuss, (2) counsel and assist, and (3) advise. 
Discussing
Colo. RPC 1.2(d), adopted by the USDC, states in relevant part that a lawyer "may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client." 24 Thus, a lawyer may discuss and explain to a client the legal consequences of any conduct given Amendment 64, the CSA, and related bodies of law. Comment 9 clarifies that, in discussing the law with a client, a lawyer is not precluded "from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct." 25 It adds that " [t] here is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct," 26 which is permitted under the Rule, "and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity," 27 which is prohibited.
Assisting and Counseling
While a Colorado lawyer is thus always permitted to discuss the in the family law context, a lawyer may advise a client about the consequences of using marijuana before, during, or after exercising parental rights or parenting time without violating the Rules. 38 Thus, it appears that permissible advising under Local Attorney Rule 2(b)(2) creates a third hybrid category of attorney conduct, in addition to discussing and assisting, pursuant to which a Colorado lawyer may do more than discuss the consequences of a proposed course of conduct with an Amendment 64 client without reaching the prohibited assisting, for example, by recommending a course of conduct based on the permitted discussion.
Conclusion
The USDC's rejection of Comment 14 introduces uncertainty into the practice of law for Colorado lawyers admitted to practice before the USDC.
Specifically, while we believe that the court's choice of law rule requires it to apply the Colorado Rules to attorney conduct not pending before it, lawyers admitted to practice before the USDC face the possibility that the court may exercise jurisdiction to discipline them for representing Amendment 64 clients in matters pending before it and even regarding representations not before it. In doing so, it might apply its Local Attorney Rules, which reject Comment 14. Moreover, Colorado lawyers also face uncertainty as to the scope of permitted advising under the Local Attorney Rules, as well as the scope of prohibited assisting. Notes 1. In this article, "Amendment 64" refers to the constitutional amendment, inclusive of the statutory and regulatory schemes
